In this study, using the World Bank's Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) data, we draw insights about the bank regulatory/supervisory styles, illustrate the differences in regulation/supervision among crisis, non-crisis and BRICS countries, and highlight the ways in which bank regulation and supervision has changed during the crisis period. The study suggests that crisis-countries had weaker regulatory and supervisory frameworks compared to those in emerging countries during the crisis. BRICS countries as a distinct block has demonstrated uniqueness in the regulatory/supervisory styles which is neither similar to crisis-countries nor with the non-crisis countries.
Introduction
Bank regulation and supervision has been the subject of much recent debate and attention due to the devastating effects of the global financial crisis. As the role of banking sector is undoubtedly indispensable in the process of financial intermediation and thereby achieving faster economic growth and sustainable development, a prudent regulatory environment can not only facilitate performance of the banking systems but also ensure financial stability. The crisis has forced the regulators and researchers to re-examine our understanding of the characteristics of financial markets and financial institutions. The financial crisis has revealed the limitations in supervisory enforcement and market discipline underscoring the importance of combining strong, timely, and anticipatory supervisory enforcement with better use of market discipline. Some micro-prudential regulations were poorly designed, contributing to systemic risk. It also highlighted the importance of basics -solid, transparent, legal and institutional frameworks to promote financial stability as well as building supervisory capacity on priority. The crisis has triggered a healthy debate on approaches to regulation and supervision among regulators, policy makers, and academics, leading to multiple proposals for further reforms. Reforms are necessitated to aim at limiting regulatory arbitrage, more transparency and simpler regulation to enhance accountability, more proactive efforts to identify and address incentive problems and make better use of regulatory resources. As financial regulators around the world endeavor to decide how best to reform bank regulation and supervision, an essential input ought to be a thorough understanding of what other countries do and eventually of the implications of these choices.
Though several studies have pointed to weaknesses in regulation and supervision as one of the factors leading to the crisis (Gonzalez, 2005; Dan, 2010; Lau, 2010; Levine, 2010; Merrouche and Neir, 2010; and Barth et al., 2012) , not only did the crisis raise important questions on the appropriateness of the regulatory and supervisory approaches pursued in the run-up to the crisis, but also it prompted regulators to consider important changes in regulation and supervision. It is widely believed that the epicenter of the crisis was in the developed countries but the contagion was seen even in the emerging and developing economies. This underscores the need to examine the recent ~ 3 ~ state of bank regulation and supervision in a wide range of countries and to compare it to the precrisis situation. This paper builds on the kind of studies that have examined the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS). Barth et al., (2004) assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility suggest that regulatory and supervisory practices that force accurate information disclosure to empower privatesector monitoring of banks and create incentives for private agents to monitor banks work best to promote bank performance and stability. Barth et al., (2006) reveal that restrictions on the entry of banks, government ownership of banks, and restrictions on bank activities hurt banking system performance. Further on, Barth et al., (2008) conclude that while many countries strengthened capital regulations and official supervisory agencies following Basel guidelines, the reforms are not likely to improve bank stability or efficiency.
The foregoing assay suggests the motivation to make a critical analysis of the regulatory environments in general and BRICS 1 countries in particular. Notwithstanding the high degree of interest in the topic and extensive work on the global regulatory framework, there is a need to examine the information on the regulatory and supervisory approaches pursued across the countries and the changes brought about by the crisis. This entails to find answers for three essential questions:
First, what was the topography of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks of countries that were directly hit by the global financial crisis? Second, how did they differ from those of the BRICS countries? Third, what lessons can be drawn for strengthening the regulatory structures of these countries? Furthermore, it is also desirable to trace how the national regulatory and supervisory practices changed since the previous survey in response to the global financial crisis. In addition, an analysis of the relationship between bank performance and stability with differences in bank regulations and supervision in BRICS countries and that of the advanced countries merits an attention.
1 BRICS countries assume significance as these five (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) emerging economies host more than 2.8 billion people or 40 percent of the world's population, cover more than a quarter of the world's land area over three continents, and account for more than 25 percent of global GDP. The five BRICS countries are distinguished from a host of other promising emerging markets by their demographic and economic potential to rank among the world's largest and most influential economies in the 21st century.
~ 4 ~
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the review of the related literature on bank regulation, supervision and efficiency. Section 3 describes the data employed for the analysis and the methodological design including the econometric approaches.
Section 4 presents the results and the related discussion. We conclude in section 5.
Related Literature
Banks are considered fragile as they have high leverage ratios, fractional reserves and high potential for a run. This calls for a greater care in regulating the banks, as they are so sensitive and fragile (Freixas and Rochet, 1997) . The twin goals of bank regulation and supervision are stability and efficiency of the financial system and often appear to pull in opposing directions. This has led to a raging debate on the nature and extent of the trade-off between the two. Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache (2002) and Beck et al., (2006) studied the effect of regulations on banking crises, and Pasiouras et al., (2006) and Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2008) have examined the effect of banking regulation on banks' overall soundness. Further, while Barth et al., (2004) have studied the effect of a broad range of regulatory and supervisory measures on bank stability at the international level, Gonzalez (2005) and Laeven and Levine (2009) have examined the banks' risk-taking behaviour.
A good strand of literature on bank governance and regulation can be broadly analysed under two strands; first, exploring the unsystematic risk because of the internal variables as its potential determinants (Brewer et al., 1996; Gallo et al., 1996; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Angbazo, 1997) and; the second, surveying the systematic risk due to the negative externalities in the financial markets, regulations and macro-economic conditions (Demirgunc-Kunt, 1989; Hassan et al., 1994) .
Both streams offer evidence of substantial correlations among the internal determinants, externalities and the bank risk. However, reviewing the banking regulation in the microeconomics perspectives authors such as Rochet (2002) , Freixas and Santomero (2002) , and Santos (2000) observe that regulation is not at its optimal level.
Categorising banking regulation as micro-prudential and macro-prudential, Hanson et al., (2011) observe that micro-prudential regulation is one in which regulation itself is a partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly miscarriage of individual financial institutions and macro-prudential approach is one that recognizes the general equilibrium effects and ~ 5 ~ strives to safeguard the financial system in entirety. Bank regulation is not only intended for fostering investor protection but also for enhancing efficiency of capital allocation for raising the efficacy of financial markets. Especially for emerging markets, the measurement used more often for regulating the banking industry include; reserve requirements, suspension of convertibility, deposits insurance and capital adequacy requirements (Eichberger and Harper, 1997) . Emphasising the need for regulation towards safeguarding banking stability, Swamy (2013) observes that ensuring overall macroeconomic balance, enhancement in the macro-prudential functioning of institutions and markets, and reinforcement of micro-prudential institutional soundness through regulation and supervision need to be regularly undertaken. A more detailed debate of the formative papers in banking regulation can be obtained in Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) , and Freixas and Rochet (1997) .
Conventional approaches to bank regulation underscore the positive features of capital adequacy requirements (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994) . Proclivity for banks to engage in risk-taking is curtailed with limited liability as against the higher levels of capital at risk. In this backdrop, capital adequacy obligations assume critical role in aligning the incentives for depositors, bondholders and other creditors (Berger et al., 1995, and Keeley and Furlong, 1990) . However, on the contrary, Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Besanko and Kanatas (1996) contend that increases in capital requirements could escalate the banks' risk-taking behavior and would have perverse effects on banking.
Quite a few notable theoretical considerations can be observed in understanding the risktaking behaviour of the banks. Risk-taking is an effect of the cause such as the -conflict of interest‖ that may arise when banks diversify their activities (such as; insurance underwriting, real estate investment and securities underwriting, etc.) as they may dump such securities on ill-informed investors in order to help firms with outstanding loans (John et al., 1994, and Saunders, 1985) . It is the factor of moral hazard that induces the risk-taking behaviour of the banks (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) , as this would lead the banks to have more opportunities to engage itself in wide range of activities (Boyd et al., 2005) . Merton (1977) was the first to quantify -moral hazard‖ issue
by relating the value of deposit insurance with that of a put option on the FDIC. In this regard, Pennacchi (2005) has evoked significant concerns of moral hazard as that induces the banks to invest in off-balance sheet portfolios with high systematic risk. Likewise, Bhattacharya et al., (1998) too
have held the view that government deposit insurance affects the behaviors of banks, which was further acknowledged by Bühler and Koziol (2004) .
The belief that banks such as -too big to fail‖ and -too big to discipline‖ often give rise to reasoning that they wield considerable economic power and consequently political clout thereby leading to aggressive risk-taking behaviour. It is observed that on evolution over a period of years, banks have grown horizontally as well as vertically to such a complex extent that they are posing difficulties in monitoring too. -Originate to distribute‖ (OTD) strategy quite obviously allows the global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) to originate risky loans and package them into asset backed securities (ABS) with structured tranches and subsequent repackaging them further as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) in upper level securitizations. Though, in the short run OTD strategy is quite attractive and convincing, in practical effect, in the long run, credit default swaps (CDS) and the synthetic CDOs engineered by G-SIFIs have resulted in multiple bets on the high-risk loans (Wilmarth, 2010) . Given the theoretical setting there is a need to study the regulatory impact on the top five banks in the banking systems during the crisis period.
The ownership structure and the management behaviour influence the risk-taking behaviour of the banks. It is widely held that bank risk 2 is dependent on each bank's ownership structure as standard agency theories advocate that bank risk-taking is influenced by ownership structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John et al., 2008). Further, Galai and Masulis (1976) and Esty (1998) have found that diversified owners in the case of limited liability firms have incentives to increase bank risk taking tendency as they collect funds from depositors and bondholders. Correspondingly, Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Kane (1985) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) have observed that managers with ‗private benefits of control' over banks tend to resort for less risk-taking. In the light of these theoretical underpinnings, one testable prediction that can be supposed is that banks with an ownership structure that empowers diversified owners tend towards more risk-taking than those banks whose owners assume a more low-key governance role holding the other factors constant. Analysing the role of global financial crisis, Hale (2012) banks' risk-taking is dependent on the corporate governance structure of the banks. In a detailed study of banking firms, providing evidence that stockholder-controlled banks embrace more risks than managerially controlled banks, Saunders, et al., (1990) have observed that management stock ownership induces their risk-taking behaviour. Further, John et al., (2000) in their seminal study on the theory of bank regulation and management compensation argue for a towering role for managerial compensation structures in bank regulation. In this backdrop, it is essential to study the impact of regulatory environment on the ownership structures during the crisis period.
Banks experience risk due to macroeconomic outlook as slowdown in economic growth is tied with high inflation, soaring interest rates and depreciating currency (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). On the other hand, Taylor (2009 ), Yellen (2009 ) and De Larosiere (2009 underscore the viewpoint that a free flow monetary policy leads to excess liquidity and consequent low interest rates leading to the burst of financial engineering and innovation which further amplify and accelerate the consequences of excess liquidity and rapid credit expansion ultimately resulting in asset bubbles. Suggesting how the relation between integration and synchronization depends on the type of shocks hitting the world economy, Kalemli-Ozcan et al., (2013) show that shocks to global banks played an important role in triggering and spreading the global financial crisis. On the other hand, Maxwel and Gitman (1989) using cluster analysis as the analytical technique, found the evidence to support the existence of multiple classes of central banks that may insulate the international banking system from externally generated shocks. Further, it is the profit seeking behaviour of banks that are at the core of the Minskyan model of financial instability. Banks' rational profit-seeking behaviour in an uncertain decision-making environment extends them to pursue risktaking financial practices that give rise to a state of escalating financial fragility (Minsky, 1975 (Minsky, , 1982 (Minsky, and 1986 . According to Yellen (2009) , asset price bubbles are at the heart of Minsky's viewpoint on how financial meltdowns occur. It is the consideration of the imperfectness of financial markets, and more particularly the -information asymmetries‖ is the source of financial instability or a crisis as is ~ 8 ~ established in Mishkin's approach (Mishkin 1999a and 1999b ) that an upsurge in information asymmetry causes ex ante a compounding risk of adverse selection. As is observed in the recent past, perverse incentives to managers that exist in the banking industry persuade them to take on too much risk, which lead to crises (Davidson, 2010) .
The foregoing theoretical framework entails us to have thorough examination of the bank regulation/supervisory environment during the crisis period and figure out what was the topography of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks of countries that were directly hit by the global financial crisis vis-a-vis that of those countries that were not directly affected? In addition, it would be desirable to examine the regulatory environment in the case of the BRICS countries and find out whether they were quite different. In addition, an analysis of the relationship between bank performance and stability with differences in bank regulations and supervision in BRICS countries and that of the advanced countries merits an attention. What lessons can be drawn for strengthening the regulatory structures of these countries? Furthermore, there exists a scope to trace how the national regulatory and supervisory practices changed and kind of inferences could be drawn to build the regulatory literature in this domain.
Data and Methodology
We Not all the responses in the BRSS questionnaire are considered for analysis due to issues of comparability. We have considered only those significant responses on questions cover topics on which consistent cross-country data are already available, easily comparable and widely acceptable. performance; and (x) supervision. We provide the description of the variables in Table 2 . Entry, structure and competition
To explore this variable we study the responses of national supervisors for the select 10 questions of the survey related to: entry norms for new banks; number of existing banks; asset concentration; government ownership and control; percent of the total foreign-owned bank assets in your domestic banking system; and applications for commercial banking licenses from domestic entities: received, denied, withdrawn and accepted.
Capital Regime
Under this capital regime variable we study the responses of national supervisors for the select 10 questions of the survey related to: minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio; actual risk based capital ratios; actual Tier 1 capital ratio; actual leverage ratio; variants of calculation of capital requirements; coverage of offbalance sheet items in estimation of leverage ratio; and variants of calculating capital requirements for credit risk.
3.
Asset classification norms
To study this asset classification norms variable we consider the responses of national supervisors for the select 5 questions of the survey related to: prevalence of asset classification system; period of arrears stipulated for classification of a loan as nonperforming; whether unrealized interest enters the income statement; upgradation of the loan classification; and minimum provisioning norms.
Provisioning
We consider select 3 questions of the survey related to: ratio of non-performing loans; ratio of specific provisions to gross non-performing loans, and ratio of general provisions to total gross loans for the analysis.
Activities
For this variable we study the responses of national supervisors for the select 3 questions of the survey related to: can banks own voting shares in nonfinancial firms; single financial supervisory agency for all of the activities; and conditions for engaging in activities such as securities activities, insurance activities, real estate activities and non-financial firms.
Protection to depositors
We consider the responses of national supervisors for the select 2 questions of the survey related to: percentage of the total deposits, the value of large denominated debt liabilities as a share of total assets for the analysis.
7.
Regulation of banking exposures
Responses of select 7 questions of the survey related to: percent of the commercial banking system's assets in foreign-currency denomination; percent of the commercial banking system's liabilities in foreign-currency denomination; percent of the commercial banking system's assets in public sector claims; assets funded with deposits; exposure to real estate loans; exposure to commercial real estate loans; and percent of residential real estate loans that were securitized, were employed for the analysis of this variable
Bank taxation
Responses of select 2 questions of the survey related to: statutory corporate tax rate; and effective tax rate are considered for analysis of this variable.
Bank performance
For the analysis of this variable, we consider responses to select 4 questions of the survey related to: after-tax return on equity; percent of non-interest income in total gross income; aggregate operating costs to assets ratio; and ratio of non-performing loans 10 .
Bank supervision
Under this variable we study the responses of national supervisors for the select 5 questions of the survey related to: power of the supervisory agency to suspend the directors' decision to distribute bonuses, management fees; power of the national ~ 11 ~ supervisor to supervise insurance, securities and pension funds; single financial supervisory agency; and onsite examinations were considered.
Note: Responses to the survey questions are obtained from the World Bank's Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) database released in 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2012. Comparing responses between the aforesaid BRSS surveys and attributing the changes observed to the crisis can be debatable as we cannot be sure that the changes observed were indeed caused because of the crisis. However to probe the changes that were directly related to the crisis, the BRSS 2012 survey includes questions that explicitly request regulators to identify reforms introduced in response to the crisis. To determine whether there are significant differences in banking regulation and supervision in crisis versus non-crisis countries and during the crisis period, we conduct a series of mean t-tests on responses to distinct survey questions in BRSS. We perform multivariate regression analyses to understand the banking sector outcomes and regulation/supervision employing a wide range of bank regulation/supervision indicators. First, we use ordinary least squares regressions to observe the relationships between bank outcomes and bank regulation and supervision.
In these regressions, we regress each of the two outcome variables (after-tax return on equity for the commercial banking system, and percent of the commercial banking system's total gross income that was in the form of non-interest income) on various supervisory and regulatory indicators. As La Porta et al., (1998) observe that legal origin helps account for cross-country differences in financial development; we include emerging markets origin dummy and BRICS dummy variables as exogenous control variables. The results of the detailed econometric analysis are presented in the ensuing section.
Results and Discussion

Entry, structure and competition
Economic literature offers differing views on the need for and the effect of regulations on entry into banking. While some argue that effective screening of bank entry can promote stability, others emphasize that banks with monopolistic power possess greater franchise value, which enhances prudent risk-taking behavior (Keeley, 1990) . Others like, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
emphasizing the beneficial effects of competition and the harmful effects of entry regulation. Foreign ~ 12 ~ banks 5 are believed to make bank-firm relationships more stable and by indirectly enhancing access to the financial system, foreign banks may benefit all firms (Giannetti and Ongena, 2012). Our approach enables us to explore whether there were significant restrictions on the entry of foreign and domestic banks that could explain the difference during the pre-crisis period and the crisis period. We observe from the paired samples mean't-test' that there is no significant change in the number of commercial banks across the groups of countries under study. Similarly, we observe that there is no significant change in the percent of assets held by commercial banks, percent of total assets held by the five largest banks, and percent of total deposits held by the five largest banks. However, we notice significant change in the government ownership in the case of crisis-countries and BRICS countries. We observe significant change in assets of foreign banks in crisis-countries, non-crisis countries and BRICS countries. Foreign-owned bank assets were also found to have experienced significant change in the case of crisis (advanced) and crisis-countries. We examine the changes in the applications accepted for commercial banking licenses from domestic entities. From the results reported in Table 4 , we observe that there is no significant change either within the group of countries or between the pre-crisis period and the crisis period. We examine the issue of entry of foreign banks by considering the response to the questionare foreign entities prohibited from entering through and present the results in Table 5 . There is a significant change in the case of joint venture foreign entities among crisis and non-crisis countries.
~ 14 ~ 
Capital regime
Literature provides conflicting predictions as to whether the imposition of capital requirements will have positive effects (Santos, 2001; Gorton and Winton, 2003) . Studies like Kim and Santomero (1988) , Besanko and Kanatas (1996) , and Blum (1999) claim that capital requirements might increase risk-taking behavior. In this study, we examine the regulatory impact on capital regime in the case of sample countries. We do not consider the relationships between capital regulations and banking performance in isolation. The results of the analysis presented in Table 6 explain that there was no significant change among the groups of countries during the periods of study in the case of minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio. However, there was a significant change in the case of actual risk based capital ratio of the banking system among crisis-countries, crisis (advanced) countries, and BRICS countries. We also observe a significant change in the case of actual tier-1 capital ratio of the banking system among crisis-countries, crisis (advanced) countries and non-crisis (advanced) countries. The results indicate that there was substantial capitalisation of banks particularly in the crisis affected advanced countries and non-crisis advanced countries. In the case of BRICS countries actual risk based capital ratio experienced a substantial increase. These observations entail to believe that there was indeed a spillover effect of the crisis on the BRICS countries. In addition, there exists a scope to reason that BRICS countries took lessons from the crisis and geared up to strengthen their banking systems.
~ 15 ~ 
Asset classification norms
In this section, with a subset of responses to five questions of BRSS survey, we examine the impact of regulation of asset classification norms among the group of countries during the pre-crisis and crisis periods. The provisioning stringency measures the degree to which a bank must make provision against a loan that is classified first as -sub-standard‖, then as -doubtful‖, and lastly as -loss‖. The results presented in Table 7 suggest that there is no significant change in the case of all the considered parameters related to asset classification in banks. These findings imply that though these norms were already in place before the crisis either their implementation was flawed or the supervisory agencies were not passionately enforcing them.
~ 16 ~ 
Provisioning for bad and doubtful assets
In this section, we assess the regulatory impact on the provisioning norms. The results presented in Table 8 that there was no significant change in the case of ratio of specific provisions to gross non-performing loans. However, significant change was observed in the case of ratio of general provisions among the non-crisis emerging countries. This leads to the inference that the non-crisis emerging countries took cue from the crisis and initiated required changes in the general provisioning for loans.
~ 17 ~ 
Regulations on bank activities and banking-commerce
In the richly available economic literature, Boyd et al., (1998) Table 9 suggest a significant change in the regulatory environment towards banks wholly owning nonfinancial firms during the crisis period in crisis and non-crisis countries as well except BRICS countries. While in the case of banks' foray into securities activities; we notice a significant change among non-crises (emerging) and BRICS countries, in the case of banks' foray into insurance activities; significant change is noticed only in non-crises (emerging) countries suggesting that there was a swift regulatory action in curbing/ceasing the banks from wholly owning nonfinancial firms particularly in advanced and emerging countries.
~ 18 ~
Likewise, emerging and BRICS countries too have taken measures in curbing/ceasing the banks from actively involving in securities activities. On the other hand, insurance activities by the banks in the emerging countries found a substantial increase. 
Protection to depositors
Deposit insurance/guarantee schemes politically are meant to prevent widespread bank runs.
To protect payment and credit systems from contagious bank runs, many governments favor deposit insurance plus effective official oversight of banks to augment private sector monitoring of banks.
Though they may encourage excessive risk-taking behavior, which some believe offsets any stabilization benefits. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) provide a detailed study on measuring the effects of the design of deposit insurance on bank fragility. Yet, many contend that regulation and ~ 19 ~ supervision can control the moral-hazard problem by designing an insurance scheme that encompasses appropriate coverage limits, scope of coverage, coinsurance, funding, premia structure, management and membership requirements. We present here the results of our assessment of the impact of regulatory environment on the depositor protection mechanisms during the pre-crisis and crisis period employing the response of the sample countries to the survey question -what percentage of the total deposits of participating commercial banks was actually covered by the scheme (Table   10 ). We observe no significant change in the depositor protection/guarantee measures suggesting that crisis did not instigate substantial changes. 
Regulation of banking exposures
In this section, we consider a subset of responses to select seven questions in the BRSS survey related to regulatory rules or supervisory guidelines regarding requirements for the management of foreign currencies, exposures of banking assets and liabilities in foreign-currency denomination, exposure of banking assets in commercial and residential real estate and their securitisation for liquidity requirements. The results of the analysis are furnished in Table 11 . We notice that foreign-currency denominated assets drastically reduced during the crisis period among the crisis, non-crisis, and non-crisis (emerging) countries. The foreign-currency liabilities shrunk drastically among the crisis (advanced) and non-crisis countries. Public sector claims sharply swelled only among the crisis (advanced) and crisis-countries suggesting that governments lent substantially to bail out these banks. Though the bank assets in residential real estate loans swelled in the crisiscountries, there was no significant change in commercial real estate loans. We do not find any significant change in the securitisation of residential real estate loans among all the groups of study ~ 20 ~ sample. One interesting observation in this section of the analysis is that BRICS countries did not experience any substantial change suggesting that there were no significant regulatory/supervisory measures initiated by these countries during the crisis period. These results suggest that these severe imbalances were caused necessarily due to the severe liquidity and credit crunch, seemed to be confined more or less to financial markets and institutions in the United States and Western Europe and also due to the absence of proper mechanisms to address such situations or failure of regulatory apparatus. 
Bank taxation
The regulatory literature ‗taxation', except in the shape of deposit insurance, justified primarily as a defense against bank runs-has played no significant role. Some of the literature refers
to capital regulation as a price-based instrument, since it effectively raises the shadow value of capital.
While IMF (2010) offers an extensive review of the comparison between taxation and regulation in the financial sector, Shackelford et al., (2010) discuss aspects of financial sector taxation in light of the crisis. In the backdrop of trying to understand whether there is a merit in the dominance of the regulatory approach to dealing with financial sector externalities warranted, or is there a more purposive role in this area for corrective taxation, the purpose of this section is to know whether there existed a significant change during the crisis period. In this section, we present the results of our assessment of a subset of responses to two specific questions related to statutory corporate tax and effective tax rate on the banking system (Table 12 ). We notice no significant change in either the statutory corporate tax rate or effective tax rate on the bank income. 
Banking performance
Banks are costly and difficult to monitor. Some theoretical model suggest that strong, official supervision under such circumstances can help prevent banks from engaging in excessive risk-taking behavior and thus improve bank development, performance and stability. Contrary view is that powerful supervisors may exert a negative influence on bank performance as they may use their powers to benefit favored constituents, attract campaign donations, and extract bribes Djankov et al., 2002) . Another strand of literature views that countries with more open, private-sector-oriented approaches to regulation and supervision tend to have greater bank development, better performance and more stable banks. The aim of this section is to assess the impact of regulatory environment on the performance of banking systems. The regulatory literature is ~ 22 ~ not rich on the rigorous assessment of which specific regulatory and supervisory standards actually matter for bank performance and stability. Regulatory agencies around the world would greatly benefit from systematic evidence on the relationship between bank performance and regulatory and supervisory systems. The results of our assessment presented in Table 13 suggest that aggregate operating costs experienced significant change only in the non-crisis emerging countries. Obviously, as is widely known, the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans experienced a significant change among the crisis, advanced as well as emerging among the crisis-countries, and the non-crisis (advanced) countries. 
Banking supervision
Literature on the overall role of the government in regulating economic activity dates back to Pigouvian period (Pigou, 1938) . Arguments in favor of government intervention such as: the existence of monopoly power, externalities, and informational asymmetries that are Pigouvian create a potentially constructive role for government interventions to offset these market failures and enhance social welfare. However, others such as Shleifer and Vishny (1998) dispute that governments act in their own interests and frequently do not ameliorate market failures. Irrespective of the theoretical debates, countries in practice assign very different priorities to bank supervision. In this backdrop, the ~ 23 ~ aim of this section is to know was there a significant change during the crisis period in the supervisory environment of the groups of countries in the study sample. Considering a subset of responses for two important questions of the survey, we assess the impact of the change. The results presented in Table   14 suggest that the power of supervisory agencies to control dividend distribution strengthened substantially in the crisis-countries only. However, onsite examinations drastically increased in the non-crisis countries more vigorously than in the crisis-countries. Interestingly the results suggest that BRICS countries did not undergo any substantial supervisory transformation in this regard. 
Regulatory impact during the crisis period
The purpose of this section is to examine the relationship between the bank regulation and supervision variables and the bank performance outcomes. We use ordinary least squares regressions to examine the relationships between bank performance outcomes (viz. after-tax return and noninterest income) and bank regulation and supervision variables detailed in Table 15 We believe there are two methodological limitations to this analysis. One is that we conduct pure cross-country regressions because information on regulations and supervisory practices is available at particular points of time. The problem with this approach is that it is challenging to control fully for potential simultaneity bias as banking-sector outcomes may influence regulations and supervisory practices. The other limitation is that only aggregate measures of bank performance as available in the BRSS are used. However, our cross-country study provides a unique assessment of the relationships between banking systems' performance and the regulation/supervision of banks of select geo-financially important 30 countries (including advanced and emerging) around the world.
~ 25 ~
The results of the multivariate regression analysis for the period 2007 are presented in Table   16 . We observe that actual risk based capital ratio is significant at 0.05 level of confidence in all the three models in the case of dependent variable -non-interest income and at 0.10 level in the case of dependent variable -after-tax return, which indicates that actual risk based capital ratio with an average of 12.91 percent had a considerable impact on profitability by compelling the banks to push up their non-interest income. This finding contributes to the theory that increasing capital adequacy ratio has an adverse impact on the profitability of the banks. On the contrary, it had a negative impact on the after-tax return of the banks as indicated by the observed negative sign of the coefficient.
Foreign-currency denominated liabilities significantly impacted with a negative effect on the noninterest income. The significant positive relationship of assets held by the top five largest banks with the non-interest income establishes that top five banks in the banking systems were actively engaged in increasing their fee-based services in order to boost their profitability. On the expected lines, residential real estate loans were found to be negatively impacting on non-interest income expounding that increasing exposure to such loans was not contributing to the profitability of the banking systems.
Taxation and deposit protection/guarantee schemes were significant but negatively impacting on aftertax return, which indicates that increasing taxation and deposit guarantee fees on the banks were adversely impacting on bank profitability. Another intriguing observation is that onsite inspections by the supervisor/s were negatively impacting on bank profitability, which reveals that banks were either not accurate or unfair in collecting their income.
~ 26 ~ Note: We report the coefficients of regression and t-statistics in parenthesis ( ) using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from an OLS regression. The levels of significance are indicated as * for 0.10 level, ** for 0.05 level and *** for 0.01 level. Each column represents one regression and the 2 nd and 3 rd columns in both the dependent variables regressions include dummy variables viz. d1 for BRICS countries and d2 for emerging countries.
We present the results of the multivariate regression analysis for the period 2010 in Table 17 .
Interestingly, existence of an asset classification system was negative impacting on after-tax return implying that banks were either inaccurate in implementing the income collection activities or asset classification norms were too taxing on their profitability. We need to note that during 2010 too, the significant positive relationship of assets held by the top five largest banks with the non-interest income confirms that top five banks in the banking systems are vigorously engaged in expanding their fee-based services to boost their profitability. Actual risk based capital ratio being found positively significant only in BRICS countries confirms the hypothesis of positive link between capital ~ 27 ~ requirements and bank profitability particularly during the post-crisis period. Power of supervisors to control dividend distribution is found to have adverse impact on bank profitability suggesting that supervisory agencies have, obligated by the crisis period experience, vigorously exercised their powers in regulating the bank directors' powers to distribute dividends. Further, this analysis verifies that there was a substantial reduction in taxation on the commercial banking systems resulting in significant positive impact on their profitability (also see Table 12 ). General provisions to gross loans is found to have significant negative impact on the profitability implying that provisioning norms were strengthened and passionately implemented by the banks backed by the learning from the crisis experience. Residential real estate loans are positively impacting on the profitability explaining that increasing exposure to such loans was now contributing to bank profitability. However, the securitisation of these loans had a substantial adverse effect on profitability. Engaging in securities activities for the banks is found to have positive effect on profitability implying that post crisis period banks have regained their hold on the securities business.
~ 28 ~ Note: We report the coefficients of regression, standard errors in italic and t-statistics in parenthesis ( ) using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from an OLS regression. The levels of significance are indicated as * for 0.10 level, ** for 0.05 level and *** for 0.01 level. Each column represents one regression and the 2 nd and 3 rd columns in both the dependent variables regressions include dummy variables viz. d1 for BRICS countries and d2 for emerging countries.
We now present the results of the multivariate regression analysis for the crisis period in Table   18 . On expected lines, non-performing loans and banks' real estate activities are found to have a ~ 29 ~ substantial negative impact on profitability. However, securitisation of residential reals estate loans is found to have a significant positive impact, which implies that during the crisis period the banks managed their incomes by securitizing major chunks of their residential real estate loans.
Interestingly, we notice that foreign bank assets have had a positive effect on bank profitability. It reveals that during the crisis period most of the banks gained their incomes from foreign banking activity as their domestic financial systems were crisis ridden. One important observation is that BRICS banking systems too experienced negative impact during the crisis period as we find the dummy variable negatively significant at 0.10 level. On the other hand, though emerging economy banking systems too had a negative impact during the crisis period, the impact was found to be insignificant.
~ 30 ~ Note: We report the coefficients of regression, standard errors in italic and t-statistics in parenthesis ( ) using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from an OLS regression. The levels of significance are indicated as * for 0.10 level, ** for 0.05 level and *** for 0.01 level. Each column represents one regression and the 2 nd and 3 rd columns in both the dependent variables regressions include dummy variables viz. d1 for BRICS countries and d2 for emerging countries.
To sum up, in terms of structure, while government ownership of banks has surged during the crisis period in the crisis and BRICS countries, there was substantial decrease in assets of foreign banks in the crisis, non-crisis and BRICS countries. However, foreign-owned bank assets were found to have substantially increased in only in the crisis-countries. There was substantial capitalisation of banks not only in the advanced countries of the crisis and non-crisis groups but also in BRICS countries which entails to believe that there was indeed a spillover effect of the crisis on the BRICS countries. Therefore, there exists a scope to reason that BRICS countries took lessons from the crisis and geared up to strengthen their banking systems. This study perceives that though these asset classification norms were already in place before the crisis either their implementation was flawed or the supervisory agencies were not passionately enforcing them. General provisions against loans drastically went up in the non-crisis emerging countries leading us to conclude that these countries have taken cue from the crisis and initiated required changes to place necessary firewalls against bank failures.
During the crisis period, swift regulatory action is felt in curbing/ceasing the banks from wholly owning nonfinancial firms, particularly in advanced and emerging countries. Likewise emerging and BRICS countries too have taken measures in curbing/ceasing the banks from actively involving in securities activities. On the other hand, insurance activities by the banks in the emerging countries found a substantial increase during the crisis period. We find no significant change in the depositor protection/guarantee measures suggesting that crisis did not instigate substantial changes in this direction. Public sector claims sharply swelled only among the crisis (advanced) and crisiscountries suggesting that governments lent substantially to bail out these banks. Further, the foreigncurrency denominated assets drastically reduced and the foreign-currency liabilities shrunk considerably, suggesting that though these awful imbalances were caused necessarily due to the severe liquidity and credit crunch, seemed to be confined more or less to financial markets and institutions in the United States and Western Europe, but then were aggravated due to the absence of proper mechanisms to address such situations or failure of regulatory apparatus. While the supervisory powers to control dividend distribution strengthened substantially in the crisis-countries only, onsite examinations considerably bettered in the non-crisis countries more vigorously than in the ~ 32 ~ crisis-countries. Interestingly the results suggest that BRICS countries did not undergo any substantial supervisory transformation in this regard.
In terms of the stringency of capital adequacy norms, there exists a positive link between capital requirements and bank performance during the crisis period. Non-performing loans and banks' real estate activities have substantially cut down bank profitability. Securitisation of residential real estate loans helped banks to manage awful liquidity needs. Interestingly, foreign bank assets have had a positive effect on bank profitability as most of these banks gained their incomes from foreign banking activity as their domestic financial systems were crisis ridden.
Conclusion
Our results offer interesting insights about the bank regulatory/supervisory styles and illustrate the differences in regulation between crisis, non-crisis and BRICS countries and highlight the ways in which bank regulation and supervision has changed during the crisis period. Drawing on the analysis, we conclude that though the financial crisis was an outcome of mis-governance as well as market failure. The world experienced different styles of regulatory/supervisory styles in dealing with the crisis. Banks in crisis-countries faced fewer restrictions to engage in non-bank activities such as insurance, investment banking and real estate activities compared to non-crisis countries. Crisiscountries were not only laidback in the treatment of bad loans and loan losses; they were deficient in regulating the capital requirements, constituting greater provisions or in suspending bonuses or withholding management fees. Even though crisis-countries had robust information disclosure requirements, the incentives for the private sector to monitor banks' risks were weaker and hence could aid in better risk management. On the contrary, emerging economies did fare better, partly because of structural reasons and partly because their policies worked in their favor. The soundness of domestic financial sectors also improved in emerging countries mostly due to better regulation and supervision, more prudent practices by financial intermediaries, and abundant local liquidity. Perhaps for the first time in recent decades, the domestic financial systems of many emerging countries did not amplify the shocks from the crisis. The analysis nevertheless suggests that crisis-countries had weaker regulatory and supervisory frameworks compared to those in emerging countries during the crisis.
~ 33 ~ BRICS countries as a distinct block has demonstrated uniqueness in the regulatory/supervisory styles which is neither similar to crisis-countries nor with the non-crisis countries. Their regulatory practices have greatly evolved and hence could sustain the onslaught of the crisis remarkably with relatively lesser damage and faster recovery.
Overall, the regulatory/supervisory styles are evolving. There have not been swift changes only due to the crisis except some noteworthy developments particularly in the area of capital adequacy, asset classification approaches, controlling the managements in dividend distribution and management fees, and allowing banks in taking up related activities like owning nonfinancial firms, dealing in securities and insurance businesses etc. Although these changes are encouraging, there still is the scope for further reforming the regulatory and supervisory structures as well as policies and practices.
